The Nanchang Uprising is recorded in the history of the Chinese revolution as a heroic feat that fired the first shot in armed resistance against the reactionary Kuomintang, marking the important birth of a new type of people's army led independently by the Communist Party. The entire battle of the Nanchang Uprising lasted nearly 5 hours, annihilating most of the enemy troops stationed in Nanchang. This article is based on memoirs, newspapers, and other historical documents to systematically examine and verify related issues such as the actual number of enemy troops in Nanchang, the situation of the uprising army annihilating the enemy, and the enemy's preparedness.

[Keywords] Nanchang Uprising, enemy troop numbers, enemy preparedness

In the early morning of August 1, 1927, various troops of the Nanchang Uprising launched an attack on the enemy according to the predetermined combat deployment. The entire battle lasted nearly 5 hours, and by dawn on August 1, most of the enemy troops inside and outside Nanchang were annihilated by our army, achieving a decisive victory. At that time, how many enemy troops were stationed in Nanchang? How many enemy troops were actually annihilated? Before the Nanchang Uprising began, were the enemy troops completely unprepared and waiting to be captured? Although there are many articles studying the Nanchang Uprising, there is little discussion on these issues. I will not make unfounded assumptions but will discuss the relevant issues of the enemy stationed in Nanchang one by one.

1. Number of enemy troops stationed in Nanchang

At that time, the number of enemy troops stationed in Nanchang, Liu Bocheng said in "The Beginning and End of the Nanchang Uprising": "Our party's front committee ordered Ye Ting, He Long, and other troops to besiege Zhu Peide and Cheng Qian's troops in Nanchang, which numbered about 3,000 people before noon on August 1, and they surrendered at dawn." Nie Rongzhen pointed out in his 1977 article "The Historical Significance and Lessons of the Nanchang Uprising" that during the uprising on August 1, "the enemy's strength in Nanchang was relatively weak, with Zhu Peide's one direct guard regiment, two regiments from the 3rd Army, and one regiment from the 9th Army, totaling about 6,000 troops." Yuan Yelie's recollection as the commander of the 72nd Regiment of the 24th Division of the 11th Army during the Nanchang Uprising mentioned that his division's chief of staff said at the battle plan report meeting: "The enemy's strength consists of Zhu Peide's one guard regiment, two regiments from the 3rd Army, one regiment from the 6th Army, and two regiments from the 9th Army, plus the garrison headquarters, totaling about more than 10,000 people." Chen Zijian recalled: At that time, the reactionary troops of the Kuomintang stationed in Nanchang included Zhu Peide's Fifth Route Army headquarters and direct guard regiment, two regiments from the 3rd Army, one regiment from the 6th Army under Cheng Qian, and two regiments from the 9th Army under Jin Handing, totaling about 10,000 people, which was inferior to the uprising army. The book "Nanchang Uprising" edited by Xiao Ke states: "In Nanchang city and its suburbs, there were only Zhu Peide's Fifth Route Army headquarters and guard regiment, the 23rd and 24th regiments of the 3rd Army, the 57th regiment of the 6th Army, and the 79th and 80th regiments of the 9th Army, along with the Nanchang garrison command and the guard troops of the puppet provincial government, totaling about 10,000 troops."

From the above historical materials, it can be roughly determined that the main enemy troops stationed in Nanchang included Zhu Peide's Fifth Front Army guard regiment, Wang Jun's 23rd and 24th regiments of the 3rd Army; Cheng Qian's 57th regiment of the 6th Army; and Jin Handing's 79th and 80th regiments of the 9th Army. However, the historical materials mention that the number of enemy troops in these regiments varies, with figures of 3,000, 6,000, and more than 10,000. So, what is the actual number of enemy troops stationed in Nanchang?

First, let's look at the number of troops in the 23rd and 24th regiments of the enemy's 3rd Army. Yuan Yelie, the commander of the 72nd Regiment of the 24th Division, disguised himself as he was about to attack the enemy's 23rd regiment of the 3rd Army on the morning of July 31, and "discovered that the enemy had a regiment headquarters, a battalion headquarters, seven infantry companies, and a heavy machine gun company, totaling more than two battalions of troops, which was much larger than the strength originally estimated by the division headquarters. Can we annihilate an enemy that is twice our size?" This indicates that the enemy's 23rd regiment had a strength that was double that of Yuan Yelie's three battalions. The 24th Division of the 11th Army had about 5,500 troops participating in the uprising. Xiao Ke recalled that the structure of the 24th Division at that time included three regiments (70th, 71st, and 72nd regiments), each with three battalions. According to Li Yimin's recollection, the 24th Division also had a newly formed training battalion of about 400 people. Therefore, it can be estimated that the strength of Yuan Yelie's battalion was about 550 people, leading to an estimate of about 1,100 enemy troops in the 23rd regiment. Thus, the total number of enemy troops in Wang Jun's 23rd and 24th regiments is approximately 2,200.

The number of troops in the 57th regiment of the enemy's 6th Army can be estimated based on Liu Bocheng's "Summary of the Revolutionary Forces in the Jiangxi Area". At that time, Wang Jun's total strength in the 3rd Army was about 14,000, while Cheng Qian's 6th Army had about 12,000. The total number of these two armies differed by only 2,000, so at the regiment level, the numbers would not vary significantly. Referring to the troop numbers of the enemy's 23rd and 24th regiments, the estimated number of troops in Cheng Qian's 57th regiment of the 6th Army is about 1,000. Therefore, the total strength of Wang Jun and Cheng Qian's three regiments is about 3,200.

The 79th and 80th regiments of the enemy's 9th Army belong to Yang Ruxuan's newly formed 19th Division, which has fewer troops than the normal establishment. According to Liu Bocheng's "Summary of the Revolutionary Forces in the Jiangxi Area": Jin Handing and Yang Ruxuan's total strength in the Nanchang and Linchuan areas was only 3,000. Liu Bocheng recorded in "The Beginning and End of the Nanchang Uprising": "On August 7, when our army arrived in Linchuan, Yang Ruxuan's troops, about 2,000, fled without fighting to the south city." This indicates that the total strength of the enemy's 79th and 80th regiments stationed in Nanchang was about 1,000.

Zhu Peide's Fifth Front Army guard regiment is a directly subordinate elite unit, "with a strength of at least over 1,000." According to the number of people from the second front guard regiment led by Lu Deming who rushed to Nanchang to respond to the uprising, it is known that the number of the second front guard regiment was over 1,000, so the number of the Fifth Front Army guard regiment is also roughly similar.

In summary, the total strength of the six enemy regiments is about 5,200. In addition, there is a guard company from Wang Jun's garrison command, the guard troops of the Jiangxi provincial government, Wang Jun's residence, the garrison command in front of the general headquarters, and scattered enemy troops at Niu Xing Station, totaling about 6,000 enemy troops stationed in Nanchang. Therefore, it is clear that the historical materials mentioned earlier estimating the enemy stationed in Nanchang at only 3,000 is obviously too low, while the estimate of over 10,000 is too high.

2. Number of enemy troops annihilated

Regarding the number of enemies killed in the Nanchang Uprising, Jiao Qikai wrote in his report on October 25, 1927: "On August 1, during the Nanchang Uprising... approximately three regiments of troops under Zhu Peide and Cheng Qian were resolved." It has been estimated that the number of three regiments is about 3,200 people. After the uprising began, some enemy troops broke through and escaped. According to the Hankou Republic Daily published on August 12: "In this battle, the Communist army captured about two regiments worth of weapons from the Fifth Front Army in the city; one regiment of the Ninth Army broke out from Shunhua Gate towards Linchuan, and part of the Third Army moved from Jian'an." From this, it can be seen that the Third and Ninth Armies had enemy troops escape, with at least one regiment's worth of personnel. Additionally, on August 14, the Shanghai News reported an interview by a journalist on the same day: "At 1:40, the 57th Regiment of the Sixth Army first attacked, intending to fire from Kuanglu Middle School (where a company was stationed), but after several gunshots, the Eleventh Army had already entered from outside, catching the Sixth Army off guard. They killed more than fifty people, and the Sixth Army stationed near the Catholic Church in Songbai Lane also continued to advance, reaching Yanyi Warehouse, where the Eleventh Army had already blocked the alley. Both sides exchanged gunfire... The number of the Sixth Army that was disarmed was already in the hundreds, while the rest escaped with their weapons." This historical material indicates that only a few hundred of the Sixth Army were disarmed, while the rest of the enemy troops escaped.

From the above, it can be inferred that the number of enemy troops that escaped was approximately between two and three regiments. By subtracting the number of escaped enemy troops from the total number of enemy troops stationed in Nanchang, it can be concluded that the number of enemies killed was about 3,000 or more. Of course, this includes the number of disarmed enemy troops. Moreover, after the uprising, most of the captured enemy troops were released. Guo Moruo arrived in Nanchang after the uprising and encountered a train at Tujiabu Station with three carriages filled with soldiers, and the platform was also crowded with many soldiers in disheveled clothing. The scattered soldiers on the platform "were all unmarked unarmed soldiers, clearly from the troops of Cheng Qian and Zhu Peide that were disarmed in Nanchang."

3. Enemy troop preparation situation

On the night of the Nanchang Uprising, the uprising troops suddenly attacked the unprepared enemy according to the pre-reconnaissance targets, directions, and routes. Most of the enemy were caught off guard and quickly surrendered. However, from the historical materials currently collected, it can be seen that the defending enemy in Nanchang had some awareness of the uprising and had taken precautions. The main reason for this was the betrayal and informant. Ye Ting mentioned in "The Failure from the Nanchang Uprising to Chaoshan": "At 2 a.m. on August 1, we encountered armed forces from Wuhan, resulting in intense fighting (because a battalion commander from He Long's unit leaked the secret in advance, the enemy had already set up strict vigilance). By dawn, the city of Nanchang was about to be cleared." Zhou Yiqun pointed out in a report on October 30, 1927: "The deputy of Zhao's regiment from the First Regiment of the First Division of the Twentieth Army, who is from Yunnan, actually planned to inform a certain regiment commander of Zhu's unit that night, but because Zhu De had already discovered the situation, he changed the plan temporarily and advanced two hours early. By 12:30 a.m., gunfire was heard, and the enemy had already known in advance, so they were naturally prepared, hence it was not until dawn that the situation was completely resolved." Li Lisan recalled: "That night, due to a certain battalion commander of the Twentieth Army leaking secrets, many difficulties were added to the operation, and it was not until 6 a.m. the next morning that the troops of the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Armies in Nanchang were completely disarmed."

This traitor was Zhao Fusheng, the deputy battalion commander of the Third Battalion of the First Division of the Twentieth Army. Around 9 o'clock, he sneaked into the enemy's Fifth Front Army headquarters to inform them, causing the uprising plan to be leaked. The enemy's Fifth Front Army headquarters was thus fully prepared in advance, which once caused significant obstacles for He Long's First Division during the attack.

If it weren't for Zhao Fusheng's betrayal, would the enemy have been completely unaware?

We can glimpse a part of this from Yuan Yelie's article "The Gunfire of August 1." Yuan's unit set out according to plan before dusk, arriving near the enemy camp after more than an hour (around 8 o'clock). Then the camp's adjutant, along with a messenger, contacted the enemy about the camping situation. At this time, the enemy staff kindly reminded our adjutant: "Just received a notice from the higher-ups, saying that the troops in the city are moving frequently tonight, and we need to be careful to prevent any incidents, please strengthen your vigilance." From the enemy staff officer's words, it can be seen that the enemy's high command was already paying attention to the movements of the uprising troops at that time. This should have happened before Zhao Fusheng's betrayal; otherwise, the enemy's higher-ups would not merely notify the lower ranks to "be careful to prevent any incidents," but should have said: "The troops are going to revolt tonight, be prepared for battle!" After that, "the enemy was not completely complacent; they sent out patrols armed with gleaming bayonets, constantly checking outside the barracks. They even approached the camping troops to look around, as if they were on guard."

In addition, Huang Xuzhou recalled: On the 31st, he entered the enemy camp for reconnaissance three times. The first time he pretended to be a cook to fetch water, and after fetching the water, it was already dark. But by the third time he came out, the main gate was already piled up with sandbags, and there was a guard; the sentry did not allow him to leave, and after several twists and turns, he finally managed to get out. Although Huang Xuzhou subsequently entered the enemy camp for reconnaissance two more times, he could not stay long due to his mission. The preparations made by the enemy should not have been because they knew about Zhao Fusheng's betrayal.

In addition to the betrayal of Zhao Fusheng, is there a possibility that other officers and soldiers leaked information? This possibility should be small.

First, the main leaders of the uprising army paid great attention to the confidentiality of the uprising.

Around 2 p.m. on July 30, Ye Ting held a meeting of officers above the battalion level in a classroom of a teaching building at the headquarters of the 24th Division by the Baihuazhou. To ensure confidentiality, sentries were set up around the meeting place to prevent the plan from leaking.

At the same time, He Long also held a meeting of officers above the regiment level at the command of the Twentieth Army. After announcing the uprising plan and issuing combat tasks, to prevent information leakage, it was decided to replace some unreliable lower-ranking officers in the troops with Communist Party members.

Secondly, in order to successfully complete the combat tasks, the regiment and battalion-level officers who learned about the uprising plan were highly vigilant and placed great importance on ensuring the secrecy of the combat plan.

After receiving the task, the commander of the third battalion of the 72nd regiment of the 24th division, Yuan Yelie, considered: "Among the officers in our battalion, the deputy battalion commander is a member of the Kuomintang, and among the company commander and political instructor, there are three members of the Kuomintang, while the platoon leaders have more members of the Kuomintang than the Communist Party. Although these Kuomintang members are considered progressive and may follow the Communist Party, their determination to fight against the Kuomintang army remains to be tested. Especially since they have many classmates from Whampoa on the opposing side, it is very likely that they will send a message, intentionally or unintentionally. In order to strictly maintain military secrets and ensure the victory of the battle, I personally went to organize the preparations before the battle." Orders were issued step by step, and the company-level officers did not receive the combat mission until the evening of the 31st, just before the troops moved. Until the moment before the battle broke out late at night, "the company commander gathered the three platoon leaders to sleep together and talked quietly for a while; then the platoon leaders slept together with the three squad leaders and talked for a while; finally, the squad leaders also talked with the soldiers for a while." This shows that in order to prevent the uprising plan from leaking, the entire communication process was very tight.

The soldier Tu Guolin, who participated in the Nanchang Uprising, recalled: "The day before the uprising, I suddenly received orders to move to Xiaoyingpan. After arriving at the camp, I had just fallen asleep when I was notified from above that there might be something happening tonight, so I should stay alert. I was awakened from my sleep and ordered to gather urgently. The team leader announced that we were entering combat, with the task of eliminating the nearby enemy forces." This means that most soldiers did not know the combat mission until the last moment before the uprising. Therefore, the traitor Zhao Fusheng could only have gone to inform the enemy around 9 PM on the night of the uprising. Because the uprising plan had been kept strictly confidential until around 9 PM on the 31st, when He Long's unit finally communicated the specific combat mission to the battalion-level officers.

Since it was not other officers and soldiers leaking the news, what was the reason that the enemy forces were prepared?

According to a later recollection by Jiang Wenguang, the deputy commander of the 20th regiment of the enemy's third army: "On the evening of July 31, I saw that the situation of Ye Ting and He Long's troops was somewhat different on the street, so I hurried to find the commander of the 21st regiment, Li Shilong, to ask him to pay attention immediately, or to take the troops out of Nanchang. But when I got there, I found Zhu De chatting casually with Li Shilong." As soon as Zhu De saw me, he knew my intention. Without waiting for any response, he took me and said: 'Wenguang, let's take a walk on the street.' Within two hours, gunfire erupted everywhere on the street.

It turned out that the frequent troop movements before the uprising had alerted the enemy forces. On July 31, the commanders of various troops began to act separately according to their combat missions, conducting reconnaissance on enemy situations and combat environments under the pretext of meeting friends and visiting allied forces. After clarifying the situation, various units approached the enemy barracks under various names such as 'moving defense' and 'training in the field' on the evening of the 31st, entering the combat initiation point. For example, Yuan Yelie’s unit set out before dusk that evening, 'the troops were arranged in a marching formation, marching grandly from west to east along the street.' At this time, 'the street was less crowded, the lights were already on, and brother units were also moving, some seemed to be gathering, and some seemed to be marching. But the officers all knew what was going on and tacitly understood each other.'

On the eve of the Nanchang Uprising, it was a peak period of division between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. Ye Ting and He Long's troops set off for Jiujiang under the pretext of 'East Expedition to Suppress Chiang,' and there were no arrangements to station in Nanchang at that time. After learning that Wang Jingwei and Zhang Fakui intended to summon them to the mountains under the pretext of a meeting to strip them of their military power, Ye and He decided not to attend the meeting at Lushan and instead moved their troops to Nanchang. After entering Nanchang, Ye and He frequently conducted drills and movements. These unusual phenomena naturally attracted the attention of the enemy.

On August 5, Wang Jingwei pointed out in his report at the 23rd expanded meeting of the second Central Committee of the Kuomintang: "As soon as I arrived in Jiujiang, I contacted Commander Zhu, Huang Shi, Huang Qixiang, and Zhu Huiri of each army, and at that time I received a very strange message, that is, the 20th army had not received orders and had moved to Nanchang on its own. Everyone knows that according to the combat plan, He Long should not have gone to Nanchang, as there were other troops assigned to Nanchang. He Long's arrival in Nanchang was simply free action, indicating that there were internal issues... On the 29th and 30th, I gathered the commanders above the division level of the 4th army, 11th army, and 20th army for discussions. Except for Ye Ting and He Long's entire army, everyone else attended, and Commander Zhang knew there was something unusual. On the 31st, another meeting was held, and everyone was worried, saying that there would definitely be changes."

Zhang Guotao, a participant in the Nanchang Uprising, mentioned in his article 'My Recollections': "On the morning of July 31, there was an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party... The attendees learned that Zhang Fakui, along with Wang Jingwei and Sun Ke, had arrived at Lushan for a meeting, and there were signs that it was aimed at Nanchang. Everyone was discussing countermeasures."

From the above two historical materials, it can be seen that the enemy's senior commanders such as Zhang Fakui and Wang Jingwei were alert to the movements of Ye and He's troops. However, before Zhao Fusheng's betrayal, the enemy had not yet accurately grasped the intelligence about the impending uprising, so they only took some preventive measures.

Although the enemy was alert to the uprising troops and even prepared, the entire city of Nanchang was actually under the strict surveillance of the uprising army, which had an absolute advantage in strength. The uprising successfully broke out, and the uprising army annihilated most of the enemy forces stationed in Nanchang, leaving a significant mark in the history of the Chinese revolution.

References:

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