The rebel army in Puning.
Release time:
2019-02-24
This is a letter from Chen Gongpei to the Puning County Chronicle Committee, explaining the activities of the August 1st Uprising Army in Puning as follows:
To the responsible comrades of the Puning County Chronicle Committee:
I have received your letter dated October 19. Recently, I have been doing some research work and have a large number of documents to review, so I cannot focus on thinking about events from thirty-five years ago. Moreover, I have neither been to Puning before or after the events, nor have I been to the Dongjiang area, so I am not clear about some geographical details. For example, the place name 'Liush沙' cannot be found on general maps, and it is also difficult to obtain materials to help recall. In fact, my situation at that time was quite special; apart from staying in Shantou for three or four days as a guard for the He Headquarters (the task was also unclear), I had no specific duties for two months and was merely a special accompanying personnel of the He Headquarters. Therefore, I did not have a clear understanding of the party, government, and military affairs. After leaving Shantou, my guard duty was naturally lifted, and I returned to an accompanying status, making it extremely difficult to have a comprehensive understanding. Even if I could recall some scattered impressions in my mind, they would probably not be sufficient for your reference in compiling the chronicle.
However, since you have inquired, I can only briefly respond to the two questions you raised, based on my recent thoughts, and this is merely a preliminary rough recollection.
(1) "Liush沙 Conference"
In Liush沙, I personally remember there was once a "crucial meeting." However, whether this meeting is considered a "conference" in party history or revolutionary military history, I have not seen such a record, so it seems worth considering whether to call a "meeting" a "conference." As for why I personally attended this meeting, I think it was due to two reasons: first, I participated in the work of the Guangdong military and civilians (or military work) relatively early; second, I had early military connections with the He Department (due to my special personal relationship with Comrade Zhou Yiqun). In terms of formal positions in the party, government, and military, I feel I am not very qualified.
However, in reality, I was present at this meeting, and I felt it was "crucial" because the discussion was about changing the banner and clarifying the political line. This issue had already objectively occurred with the Nanchang Uprising, but it had not been properly studied or discussed, such as the "land revolution," "the establishment of a government led by the party," and "self-reliance and international assistance" and other specific methods. These important issues should have been regularly contemplated over the past two months, but under Zhang Guotao's erroneous leadership, they were never raised, and along the way, there was no proper work done with the party and the masses, as if all hope was placed on "going to Haikou and waiting for external aid." Such important issues were only formally raised at Liush沙, and more people met (for example, Comrade He Long, who joined Comrade Liao Qianwu and me in Ruijin).
The reason this issue could be raised, I think (because I do not know the actual situation, I can only speculate), is related to Comrade Zhang Tailai (i.e., Zhang Tailei) being in Shantou just before we left. It is also possible that the decision to leave Shantou and move to Haifeng was precisely because Comrade Zhang Tailai, along with Soviet comrades (whether they were Soviet or other nationalities from the Third International, I do not know, and I do not know their names, but I saw them when he and Comrade Tailai met with Comrade He Long), made the decision in Shantou. Because this decision to evacuate Shantou was indeed very hasty, to the extent that there was little preparation for marching, camping, and other connections along the way, as far as I know, there was not much preparation, and even reconnaissance along the way was not conducted properly—I know this personally, but I am not very clear about whether there was any, as I did not participate in specific military work, and I am not very familiar with this work.
It seems that Zhang Tailai and that foreign comrade did not leave with the troops from Shantou but went directly from Shantou to Hong Kong, because I remember that they did not participate in the Liush沙 meeting, and Comrade Li Lisan's need to go to Shanghai to take on important responsibilities for the Central Committee should have been conveyed by Comrade Zhang Tailai. Because at the time of the Liush沙 meeting, it seemed that Comrade Lisan was in charge, and he informed everyone that they were going to Shanghai.
The meeting place seemed to be in a rural house in the middle of Liush沙 village (Liush沙 was a small village at that time, and I remember it seemed to have only one not very long street, not even a town). We were eating and resting in a rural house, occupying only a small hall, with a rural wooden table in the middle and two makeshift wooden beds beside it for sitting and eating, and there was not much space left, so it could not accommodate many people. Outside the hall was a small courtyard, and to the south of the courtyard was the entrance, which was also very small, completely a small rural house, and could only accommodate a few people standing. The rooms on both sides of the hall were locked, and the doors were not opened, so we did not go in. This indicates that this meeting was not pre-prepared, nor was it a large-scale conference; it was not permitted during the march, and we were notified to camp in Kuitan that day, so we were not prepared to spend much time in Liush沙. Therefore, there was no time to discuss such major issues; it was merely a matter of possibly important representatives of the party conveying important points of the Central Committee's policies to a few comrades responsible for military work.
At the time of the Nanchang Uprising, the party originally had a front committee in charge of the matter, but it was not public, at least I do not know much about it. This matter may now only be clear to Comrades Zhou Enlai and Li Lisan; Tan Pingshan should understand, but he has been dead for many years and cannot be verified. In fact, there were very few people involved, and Zhang Guotao represented the Central Committee during this period. Zhang Tailai's first step in Shantou should have been to convey the Central Committee's intentions to the "front committee," and the specific approach might have been confirmed in Hailufeng, while in Liush沙 it was merely a preliminary communication to prepare the military leaders mentally. Because at that time, the front committee had Zhang Guotao and Tan Pingshan participating, the organization was not sound, and before leaving Shantou, Zhang Tailai hurriedly conveyed the message without time for detailed discussion on such major issues and making specific arrangements, so there could not be proper arrangements in Liush沙. At the beginning of the meeting, it was only Comrade Li Lisan (and possibly also Comrade Yun Daiying) who said that the Central Committee had new major decisions, and Comrade Li Lisan also said he had to return to Shanghai for work. After about half an hour, the main points had not yet been stated, and it was Comrade Peng Pai who directly stated that they would carry out the land revolution, distribute land, raise the red flag, and act immediately. As for how to act, it was not mentioned; at that time, everyone had no objections, and nothing specific could be decided immediately. Comrade Peng Pai himself did not propose specific methods, but after about fifteen minutes, the troops were to continue marching, and the meeting was concluded. Originally, there could have been further discussions on the way, but it was already around three in the afternoon, and not far from the village entrance, a situation arose ahead, and everyone returned to their respective units, making further discussions impossible.
(2) Activities of the Uprising Army before and after entering Puning.
As far as I know, as mentioned earlier, the hope was to receive international assistance after reaching Haikou from Nanchang to Shantou, and then make decisions on future actions. However, within three days after arriving in Shantou on September 24, there was still no news (at least I personally did not know, probably there was none; if there were, I would have known something). Then the entire army set off for the Tangkeng front line, leaving the rear (Shantou) empty. There was not enough time to carry out any party-building or governance work, and there was also a counter-revolutionary uprising in Shantou during this period. I was personally tasked with a completely new, inexperienced, and unprepared garrison duty, almost like playing a game of empty city strategy, nearly unarmed, in a state of confusion, and unaware of the detailed work regarding the party, government, and the masses. At that time, I was twenty-five or twenty-six years old; as long as I could hold the office and defend Shantou, I considered it to be my utmost effort. This was certainly also thanks to the help of Zhou Enlai and Zhou Yiqun (Comrade Zhou Enlai was in Shantou, Comrade Yiqun was in Chaozhou, Comrade Enlai presided over the Central Military Commission with about ten or eight guards, and Comrade Yiqun led over a thousand people to defend Chaozhou, with about two to three hundred people claiming to be a battalion to assist in the defense of Chaoshan, and that was it). It can be said that within three to five days of taking office, I managed to survive the counter-revolutionary uprising and safely leave Shantou. Looking back now, I realize I exhausted all my strength at that time because I had no connection with the personnel of the He department. From Nanchang, I only had one accompanying service staff, with neither firearms nor other military supplies (like binoculars), and I did not participate in the work of other agencies. Suddenly taking on this heavy responsibility, I now feel it was quite inexplicable, relying solely on the party, while the situation at that time felt particularly delicate.
The number of the 'Front Committee' was about less than ten people (including Zhang Guotao). Zhang was reclusive and did not get close to the masses, which felt quite mysterious. Tan Pingshan had significant contradictions with Zhang Guotao regarding the Nanchang Uprising, and he marched along with the He department, rarely engaging in activities and having little insight. Li Lisan seemed to be responsible for political security work, and there was no notable performance along the way, but at least there were no incidents. The only ones who were relatively well-informed about the situation in Chaoshan and the Dongjiang area were Zhou Enlai and Peng Pai. Although Tan Pingshan had held significant party responsibilities in Guangdong, he was quite dull. Comrade Peng Pai was known for his work in the agricultural movement in Hailufeng, but I do not know the overall situation in Dongjiang; only Comrade Zhou Enlai, who held important party and military responsibilities during the Eastern Expedition from 1925 to 1926, spent nearly a year in Dongjiang, so apart from Comrade Zhou Enlai, the party and mass work relied solely on Peng.
Li Lisan had served in the national labor movement and should have some knowledge about the Guangdong seamen, but I do not know what his performance was in Shantou. Other accompanying people from Guangdong, such as Peng Zemin, were non-party members, and military personnel like Ye Ting were busy with military affairs. Therefore, regarding the mass movement in Dongjiang and the party's work, I personally speculate that only Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Peng Pai could have some knowledge of the situation at that time, but Peng Pai died early. Now only Comrade Zhou Enlai might have some recollections, but he was busy with work and it was also not easy to meet. The only way was through party channels to see if he could spare some time to discuss or write down fragments or entire sections of materials.
As far as I know (which I only learned in the past year or two), after the righteous army arrived in Shantou, Comrade Zhou Enlai sent Liu Lidao, a graduate of the first class of Whampoa Military Academy, to Hailufeng to withdraw several tens of thousands of yuan for use in Shantou. Liu Lidao traveled back and forth between Hailufeng and Shantou, of course passing through Puning. Moreover, according to Huang Yong, who was partially responsible in Hailufeng at that time (currently a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference residing in Beijing), Liu Lidao insisted on receiving cash at that time, refusing any banknotes, including Hong Kong dollars and foreign currencies, so a large number of porters had to be sent from the Hailufeng base to transport to Shantou. When the army reached Liusha, the silver porters happened to arrive as well. I did see some silver porters arrive at the He department at that time and opened the boxes for distribution. It can be seen that there should have been considerable contact in Puning at that time, but why did enemy troops suddenly appear in Liusha on the afternoon of October 1? What kind of enemy troops were they? Were they the formal reactionary troops from Guangdong or local reactionary militia armed by landlords? It seems that it is still unclear to this day. If the local party and mass work had been good that day, there would not have been a hasty response to the battle.
However, after the battle (that is, on the night of the encounter at Liusha), I passed by a temple and met some young people and three or four old farmers (one of whom seemed to be the mother or grandmother of the young man) who were having a night talk, and their attitude towards me was very good. This young man even referred to our army as 'our army' and led us, walking all night and making various preparations for us, which shows that the local people were very close to us. This young man seemed to be a student and had a good relationship with the farmers. The place where we met that night was no more than ten or eight miles south of Liusha, and I can no longer remember his name. Looking back now, I still find the local people lovely.
Chen Gongpei
Room 79, Dormitory 22, Xihuangchenggen, Beijing
(The original document can be found in the materials compiled by the Puning County People's Committee's Historical Research Association: 'Historical Materials of the Revolutionary Struggle of the People of Puning during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War.' Transcribed from the Nanchang 'August 1st' Uprising Memorial Hall)
"Materials of the Nanchang Uprising"
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